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Commodities, infl ation and monetary policy: a global perspective
The authors of this article are Paula López Urruchi, Juan Carlos Berganza and Enrique Alberola of the Associate 
Directorate General International Affairs.1
Over the past year, the issue of rising commodity prices has attracted growing interest and 
raised concern at international level owing to its macroeconomic (the rise in infl ation and 
impact on the economy), social (redistribution effect) and, indeed, geopolitical repercus-
sions.
This article briefl y describes developments in commodity prices with an emphasis on food, 
reviews the reasons behind these developments and assesses the short and medium-term 
outlook, before focusing on the macroeconomic implications. It looks, in particular, at the po-
tential impact of rising commodity prices on infl ation and monetary policy in a global context 
marked by considerable uncertainty and the slowdown in some of the biggest economies. The 
analysis is geared towards emerging economies for the following reasons: fi rst, they are, in 
theory, more exposed to the infl ationary impact of an increase in commodity prices; second, 
the anti-infl ation credibility of their monetary authorities is, in general, less anchored than in the 
advanced economies; and lastly, the monetary policy conduct is complicated in some coun-
tries by rigid exchange rate regimes and/or as a result of their status as exporters of com-
modities. The same reasons dictate that emerging countries are likely to run a greater risk of a 
deterioration in infl ation expectations. Furthermore, the rise in commodity prices has greater 
social implications in emerging countries and requires a more active policy response by the 
economic authorities.
The prominence of emerging countries in the global economy is ever greater and they have so 
far displayed relative resilience to the effects of the fi nancial turmoil and the slowdown in the 
advanced economies.2 Consequently, they are proving instrumental in maintaining the dyna-
mism of the global economy. This means that their response to the increase in global infl ation-
ary pressures transcends their borders and also has global implications. 
The upward trend in commodity prices started in 2002. Between 2002 and April 2008, prices 
increased by 277% in nominal terms and by 214% in real terms, according to the IMF index 
used in this article (see the upper panels in Chart 1). However, considerable differences in the 
fi gures can be observed for different commodities. In the period 2002-2006, food prices grew 
at a very moderate pace, while metal and energy prices recorded very signifi cant growth. 
However, since 2006 food prices have gained ground, posting an annual average growth of 
23% in real terms, exceeding metals (19%) and drawing close to energy (24%). This upward 
trend has strengthened over the past year, such that the year-on-year rate of growth of the 
aggregate index now stands at around 40%, with food at a similar level and energy at 60%. 
The price of oil has reached all-time highs in real terms, while the prices of metals and food are 
at levels not seen since the 1980s, at least in nominal terms; in real terms, however, they are 
far off their historical peaks. In short, the sharp, prolonged and generalised rise in commodity 
prices following a twenty-year downward trend, has brought about a fundamental change in 
the structure of relative prices at global level.
Introduction
Developments in 
commodity prices
1. We would like to thank Sarai Criado for her work on the increase in food prices, on which we based the second part 
of this article, along with José María Martínez Pérez for providing us with the charts. 2. See Alberola, Broto and Gallego 
(2008).
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The reasons for this increase are mainly structural and derive from the disparity between ac-
celerating demand and the relatively rigid response of supply.3
On the demand side, the economic development of the emerging countries has had signifi cant 
implications for the consumption of all types of commodity, partly owing to the fact that they 
are used more intensively than in other regions. Developing countries use energy less effi -
ciently, which is why the growth in energy demand associated with an increment of one unit of 
productivity or consumption is greater than that for developed countries. Similarly, develop-
ment itself leads to changes in the habits of consumers and affects diet. So, emerging Asia 
3. Banco de España (2007): See Box 3.1 of the Annual Report 2007, chapter 1.1.
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now consumes higher levels of protein and, indirectly, of cereals. In short, the contribution of 
emerging countries to the ever-growing demand for commodities – and food in particular – is 
far greater than that of the advanced economies (see the lower left-hand panel of Chart 1). 
These structural changes have been observed for some time and are expected to continue 
exerting sustained upward pressure on the demand for commodities.
With regard to supply, a distinction should be drawn between renewable and non-renewable 
resources. In the case of non-renewable resources, such as oil or metals, there is usually little 
possibility of adjusting supply in the short term, especially when there is no surplus capacity. 
In the medium and long term, this is limited to resources with proven reserves. On the con-
trary, for food and agricultural commodities, the elasticity of supply is greater in the short term, 
and in the medium and long term. But in recent years, bad weather and, in some cases, fac-
tors limiting the increase of yields and acreage have prevented supply from meeting demand.
In short, the combination of supply, which is adjusting in a slow and limited way, and a par-
ticularly marked rise in demand has led to a sharp drop in inventories and a notably prolonged 
and steep rise in prices.
It is worth highlighting the increasingly close link between the respective developments in energy 
and food commodity prices, which occurs mainly via two channels. The fi rst is the increase in the 
production of biofuels as substitutes for traditional fuels, which has occurred in response to a 
proliferation of farming subsidies in the context of concerns over climate change. This has gener-
ated additional demand for food commodities, such as maize, sugar cane and plant oils, putting 
extra pressure on prices and, in turn, upward pressure on the prices of related subsititutes. It is 
not clear what impact biofuels will have on energy and food commodity prices in the long term, 
but they are an additional factor contributing to the structural growth in demand for agricultural 
products. The second channel relates to the importance of energy as an input in farming (fertilis-
ers, harvesting and storage) and in the transportion of agricultural commodities. Already in 2004, 
the proportion of energy costs in farming costs fl uctuated at around 50% for some cereals, such 
as wheat, and at around 20% for other crops, like soya (see the lower right-hand panel of Chart 
1). Both of these channels are contributing to the upward pressures on agricultral commodity 
prices and to the duration of the process, although it is diffi cult to determine to what extent.
Lastly, fi nancial factors, such as the increase in non-tradable positions in commodities, low real 
interest rates or the weakness of the US dollar, may be strengthening the above-mentioned 
price rises and increasing their volatility.
Furthermore, most of the factors considered point towards the prices of some staple goods 
remaining at elevated levels in the medium term. Energy and food prices will probably remain 
high owing to the greater constraints on expanding supply. However, the duration of the cur-
rent cycle of food price rises, which has far exceeded that of previous cycles, coupled with the 
sharp and accelerating rate of increase in demand, also explain the particularities of the cur-
rent boom cycle in this sector.
Following several years of relative stability at 2-3%, the global infl ation rate started to rise in late 
2006, and this trend has gone largely unabated since. The global infl ation rate rose in year-on-
year terms from 2.4% in December 2006 to 4% in December 2007 and 4.5% in March 2008, 
an increase of more than 2 pp (see the upper left-hand panel of Chart 2).
In the developed countries, infl ation rose from 2% to 3.2%, up 1.2 pp, while in the emerging 
countries it reached 7.2%, an increase of almost 4 pp (see the upper right-hand panel in Chart 2). 
The increase in headline 
infl ation and the stability 
of core infl ation
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In relative terms, the rise in infl ation was also steeper in emerging countries as a whole (116% 
since the end of 2006 compared with 60% in the advanced economies). As a whole, the 
emerging countries account for approximately three-fi fths of the overall rise in infl ation since 
the end of 2006 (1.2 pp), even though they account for only 30% of GDP in the sample used.4 
The rise has been greater and more prolonged in China (5.5 pp and almost 200% in relative 
terms)5, with its contribution reaching 0.8 pp.
This rising trend in consumer prices has caused the infl ation forecasts for 2008 to be revised 
upward several times for all geographical areas from the second half of 2007 (see the lower 
left-hand panel of Chart 2). Particularly notable were the revisions upward for Eastern Europe 
and South East Asia of over 3 pp compared with the mid-2007 forecasts. However, both mar-
ket consensus and the expectations implicit in fi nancial instruments continue to point in the 
medium and long term to a gradual return to previous rates of infl ation. The infl ation forecasts 
for December 2009, therefore, are in general substantially below current rates of infl ation, at 
close to 2% for the United States and the euro area, 4% for emerging Asia and 6-7% for Latin 
America and Eastern Europe.
The fact that the rise in headline infl ation has taken place in a context of relatively stable core 
infl ation has probably anchored medium-term expectations. Indeed, the upper left-hand panel 
of Chart 2 shows that global core infl ation continues to average around 2%, although it has 
started to rise in several emerging countries since the end of 2007. This development has 
opened a growing gap between overall and core infl ation at the global level, which already 
stands at over 2 pp, the widest it has been in recent years. The widening of the gap has been 
fairly generalised across geographical areas, with the cases of China in Asia, Chile and Peru in 
Latin America and the United States and the euro area among the developed countries all 
standing out.
The above-mentioned analysis is based on a measure of core infl ation that is intended to be 
as consistent as possible across countries. To this end, the food (processed and unproc-
essed) and energy components were excluded from the overall index for each country. In a 
number of cases, the measures used differ from the offi cial measures of core infl ation em-
ployed by central banks, which often design them to refl ect persistent changes in overall 
price levels. The excluded components are more volatile or more prone to transitory shocks: 
unprocessed food, energy, administered prices, impact of the exchange rate on indirect 
taxes, etc. The decision to use one measure over another is intentional, which is why atten-
tion is drawn to this in the literature.6 The fact that numerous central banks use this variable 
in their communication with the public or, to a lesser extent, to set the infl ation target under-
lines its importance. The lower right-hand panel of Chart 2 shows the divergence between 
the measure of core infl ation used in this article and the national measures used by Latin 
American countries. The aggregate of the offi cial measures of core infl ation used in the re-
gion indicates stronger infl ationary pressures than the consistent measure and enables dif-
ferent conclusions to be drawn as to developments in the transitory component of infl a-
tion.
4. The sample includes 35 countries: 22 developed countries and 13 emerging countries. The former account for 51% 
of world GDP and the latter for 22%, i.e. the sample represents around 73% of world GDP. According to the most recent 
fi gures released by the World Bank, there are a total of 141 developing and emerging countries, representing 43.6% of 
world GDP and 31 developed countries, which account for the remaining 56.4%. 5. If China had been excluded from 
the aggregate of emerging countries, the developed countries and the emerging countries would have recorded similar 
rises in infl ation in relative terms. 6. For an international comparison of the various offi cial measures of core infl ation, 
see, for example, McCauley (2007) and the Bank of Mexico (2007). For an analysis of the problems encountered in devis-
ing a measure of core infl ation and the implications of various options, see, for example Clark (2001) or Silver (2006).
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Looking at the gap between overall and core infl ation, it is clear that food and energy have 
been behind the rise in headline infl ation at the global level since late 2006. The upper panel of 
Chart 3 also illustrates this point and further confi rms that, in recent months, energy price in-
creases, boosted by a signifi cant base effect, have made a very strong contribution to the rise 
in the global infl ation rate. However, since the aim of this article is to focus on emerging 
economies and the impact of the food price increases are particularly important for these 
economies, this section will focus on food prices.
When explaining the impact of international food prices on infl ation in individual countries, it is 
necessary to distinguish between two types of effect: (1) the pass-through effect derived from 
the transmission of international prices to the corresponding domestic component of the CPI; 
and (2) the composition effect, derived from the weight of the food component in the overall 
index.
With regard to the pass-through effect, the centre left-hand panel of Chart 3 shows food infl a-
tion by region between 2006 and the opening months of 2008. It is measured by comparing 
the food component of the CPI relative to developments in food commodities internationally.7 
The sharp increase in international food commodity prices is only partially refl ected in the food 
component of the CPI, although to differing degrees of intensity across the regions, and there 
tends to be more pass-through in emerging countries. This is a reasonable outcome, since it 
is usually the case that, the lower the level of development, the larger the share of commodity 
prices in the total cost of the fi nal consumer good. This is presumably because the value 
added between the commodity and the consumer good is lower on account of lower wage 
costs and the fact that there are fewer stages of production and intermediation. 
As far as the composition effect is concerned, with an identical increase in food infl ation in each 
country, the larger the weight of the food component, the higher the impact on headline infl ation. 
In this regard, a simple statistical analysis indicates that, indeed, there is a positive relationship for 
a large sample of countries – which is statistically very signifi cant – between the weight of food 
components in the CPI and the increase in headline infl ation from the end of 2006 to the latest 
data available at the time of this report going to press. The centre right-hand panel of Chart 3 il-
lustrates the strong positive relationship compared with the assessment of the starting level of 
infl ation in each country and confi rms the relevance of the composition effect: a 10 pp difference 
in the weight of food components in the CPI implies an additional 1 pp rise in infl ation.
Additionally, the lower panels of Chart 3 illustrate how the lower per capita income, the heavier 
the weight of food in the overall consumer price index and also the stronger the transmission of 
the increase from international to national prices for these goods. This explains why in emerging 
countries the rise in infl ation – which has contributed signifi cantly to food price increases – has 
been around 3 pp higher than in the developed countries.
Further factors, some of which are idiosyncratic, may have infl uenced the impact of the increase in 
international commodity prices on infl ation in individual countries, for example the position in the 
cycle or the various shocks in each economy. In recent years, strong demand pressures and symp-
toms of overheating have thus been identifi ed in many emerging economies. The cyclical position 
and demand pressures are associated with two factors which merit particular attention in the cur-
rent circumstances and which, as will be seen in the following section, are also closely interrelated:
Food commodities and 
infl ation
7. The fi gures for 2008 were calculated using the data available for the opening months of the year only. If year-on-year 
rates recorded for the remainder of the year are similar to those recorded during the fi rst few months, food infl ation in 
2008 will exceed that in 2007 and will be signifi cantly higher than the 2006 rate in most countries.
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(a) the real terms of trade, i.e. relative export prices compared with relative import prices, es-
pecially in commodites exporting countries; and
(b) the economic policy options in each country and, most particularly, monetary policy and its 
relationship to the current exchange rate regime.
The rise in infl ation following a prolonged period of very moderate infl ation rates raises important 
issues and challenges, globally and for the national authorities, in developed and emerging coun-
tries alike. Nevertheless, the emerging countries face a greater challenge for two reasons. First, 
because low infl ation is a recent achievement: the substantial and persistent easing in infl ation in 
most emerging countries, which was particularly marked in Latin America, led in the 1990s to the 
use of nominal anchors, which initially were external (forms of fi xed or rigid exchange rate regimes) 
and are increasingly internal, based on infl ation targeting regimes and greater monetary discipline 
by the central banks. The disinfl ation process also benefi ted from the entry into global trade of 
new and highly dynamic competitors, such as China, and from structural reforms. Against this 
background, the recent rise in infl ation is a critical test for these countries, since it will reveal 
whether the transition towards a sustained low infl ation regime, consisting of the anchoring of 
agents’ infl ation expectations and the credibility of the monetary authorities, has taken root or 
whether the progress made in recent years in terms of price stability will be reversed. 
Second, many emerging countries are exporters of commodities, posing an additional chal-
lenge in terms of infl ationary pressures. As shown in the left-hand panel of Chart 4, oil export-
ing countries and Latin American economies that export metals and agricultural commodites 
have witnessed a signifi cant improvement in their terms of trade in recent years, also owing to 
the fact that they are open economies (see right-hand panel of Chart 4).
In order to assess more accurately whether economic policies are responding adequately to 
the persistent increase in commodity prices, it is useful to start by analysing the impact of the 
latter on the economy and on adjustment mechanisms.
An increase in the price of commodities used in the supply chain entails an increase in produc-
tion costs, which in the traditional aggregate supply and demand model produces an upward 
The adjustment of the 
economy and the 
monetary policy response
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shift in the supply curve (see the left-hand panel of Chart 5), whereby the same quantity of 
goods is supplied at a higher price. The impact of an increase in commodity prices on aggre-
gate demand depends on whether the terms of trade are deemed to be improving or worsen-
ing. This is depicted in the right-hand panel of Chart 5, where the steeper slope of the TT curve 
indicates an improvement in the terms of trade and the perpendicular curve represents equi-
librium in the domestic market in (non-tradable) goods produced by a country (see Dornbusch 
(1980) and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996)). If the terms of trade deteriorate, the value of the coun-
try’s real income declines, leading to lower spending capacity, which restricts aggregate de-
mand. To some extent, this effect offsets the infl ationary impact of the rise in commodity 
prices, but reinforces the adjustment of the economy (the demand curve moves leftward). On 
the contrary, if the terms of trade improve, the purchasing power of a country increases, lead-
ing, in normal circumstances, to an improvement in the external balance. With respect to the 
supply and demand model, the demand curve shifts towards the right, indicating the expan-
sionary nature of the improvement in the terms of trade. In addition, this also leads to an in-
crease in output and investment in export sectors, which has a positive effect on supply and 
potential output, but does not neccessarily counter the negative impact on the increase in 
costs in the rest of the economy (for the sake of simplicity, this impact is not depicted in the 
supply and demand model).
The fi rst conclusion that can be drawn from this simplifi ed analysis is that the rise in commod-
ity prices does have an infl ationary impact, and one that will increase the more commodities 
are used as an input in the various supply chains (shift in aggregate supply) and the greater the 
improvement in the terms of trade (shift in aggregate demand). The ultimate impact on the 
economy will depend on the relative shift in the supply and demand curves and on the attend-
ant elasticity.
For the economy to accommodate the terms of trade shock, it is necessary to adjust the real 
exchange rate. An improvement in the terms of trade would lead to an appreciation of the real 
exchange rate (the scale of which would depend on how permanent the improvement was 
perceived to be). This would imply stronger demand for imports at the expense of non-trada-
ble domestic goods, such that the external surplus would tend to ease off and excess demand 
to correct itself. In accordance with the right-hand panel of Chart 5, this appreciation would 
result in equilibrium at point C.
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Confi rmation that real appreciation is occurring is provided by the revaluation of the nominal 
exchange rate or higher infl ation. Under a fl exible exchange rate regime, this is the factor that 
would be most likely to adjust itself. However, in the case of a more rigid exchange rate, the 
adjustment tends to take place by means of higher infl ationary pressures. Under fl exible ex-
change rates, monetary policy can help to contain infl ation by the raising of interest rates, 
which helps to moderate demand and facilitates the adjustment of the nominal exchange rate. 
In contrast, exchange rate rigidity hinders the achievement of price stability, in that the ex-
change rate makes no contribution when it comes to abating infl ationary pressures, and nor is 
it possible, given free circulation of capital, to increase interest rates autonomously. In these 
circumstances, there are signifi cant constraints on the use of monetary policy to counter infl a-
tionary pressures, and the risks to price stability in the medium term increase considerably.
In the case of a worsening of the terms of trade, i.e. in countries which are not net exporters 
of commodities (mostly developed countries), there is less need for a monetary policy re-
sponse. On one hand, demand pressures work in favour of the required adjustment. On the 
other, the depreciation of the nominal effective exchange rate, which may add to infl ationary 
pressures, will forseeably be of a lower magnitude than in the opposite case, given that the 
relative share of commodities in a country’s imports is usually much smaller than the weight of 
commodities in the exports of those countries benefi ting from the enhanced terms of trade.
In practice, individual central banks have applied different monetary policy responses to the 
rise in infl ation. It is diffi cult to see these outside of the context of the fi nancial turmoil, the sharp 
slowdown in the United States and the deterioration in global growth expectations.
The left-hand panel of Chart 6 depicts the variation in percentage points in offi cial interest rates 
and in infl ation since the start of the rise in late 2006, distinguishing between developed and 
emerging countries. The points above the diagonal line between the axes represent a reduc-
tion in real interest rates, giving an indication of which countries have, ex-post, relaxed their 
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monetary conditions in the period under review. This interpretation should be viewed with cau-
tion, since decisions on monetary policy are taken in relation to anticipated developments in 
infl ation rather than to actual ex-post infl ation. In any case, it is telling that, although most 
countries have raised their offi cial interest rates, the rise in infl ation has meant that, in all but 
one (Colombia), real interest rates have decreased. This suggests that monetary conditions 
have eased across the board during the period of rising infl ation.8 This conclusion can be 
drawn for the developed and the emerging economies alike, although the marked fall in real 
interest rates of over 4 pp in the United States and several emerging economies (such as 
China and Russia) is notable.
With regard to the exchange rate regime, the right-hand panel of Chart 6 plots average infl a-
tion for a sample of emerging countries, broken down in terms of countries with fi xed or rigid 
exchange rates and those with fl exible exchange rates according to the IMF classifi cation. In-
fl ation is much higher for rigid exchange rate regimes (13% compared with 7%) and the recent 
rise in infl ation is also sharper, in both absolute and real terms. This situation is the opposite to 
that of a few years ago, when the exchange rate anchor was key in reducing infl ation expecta-
tions. The upward pressures on the real exchange rate seen in emerging economies in recent 
years as a result of both the improvement in the terms of trade and large fi nancing infl ows have 
led to higher infl ation in economies with rigid exchange rate regimes. This is exemplifi ed by the 
Persian Gulf economies, whose terms of trade have improved most substantially and whose 
economies are pegged to the US dollar. This particularly complicates their monetary policy 
conduct as, in addition to having to implement a more generous than necessary monetary 
policy, in parallel with the monetary loosening in the United States, their currencies have de-
preciated (in real effective terms). This combination reinforces what are already signifi cant in-
fl ationary pressures. For this reason, the current monetary policy framework puts central banks 
in the region in a very diffi cult situation as far as maintaining price stability is concerned.
The above-mentioned charts suggest that, in general, monetary policy is responding only in a 
limited way to the rise in infl ation and that, under rigid exchange rate regimes, the response 
tends to be even more constrained. It is worth reiterating that the increase in commodity 
prices represents a change in relative prices. In principle, monetary policy should be geared 
towards preventing this adjustment of relative prices from giving rise to second-round effects 
on prices and wages and towards keeping infl ation expectations anchored. In this context, the 
moderate monetary policy response in developed countries can be attributed to the fact that 
infl ation expectations continue to be anchored, although concerns are growing in this respect. 
It is also worth noting that there has been a marked downward revision of growth expectations 
in the United States and other advanced economies and that uncertainty continues to prevail 
as far as developments in the international fi nancial markets and their effects on the global 
economy are concerned.
The timidity of the response in the emerging countries is more striking given that demand con-
tinues to be dynamic, particularly in commodity exporting countries. It has been observed that 
countries tend to avoid sharp currency appreciations, including those with fl exible exchange 
rate regimes. This has led a number of governments to intervene in the exchange markets. 
There are various arguments in favour of limiting currency appreciations or, in the case of fi xed 
exchange rate regimes, revaluing the exchange rate. First, certain sectors of tradable goods 
other than commodities have seen their competitiveness deteriorate (‘the Dutch disease’) and 
are concerned that it will not remain viable, leading to a permanent impact on the productive 
8. In any event, some countries have tightened monetary conditions by other means, such as larger reserve require-
ments. 
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and export structure. This would constitute a natural adjustment if the change in relative prices 
were permanent. However, the uncertainty in this regard explains the resistence to apprecia-
tion. Second, given the scale of the food and oil price increases, some authorities argue that 
their reluctance vis-à-vis appreciation is warranted, because an extremely signifi cant apprecia-
tion of the exchange rate would be necessary for it to have the required impact in terms of 
controlling infl ation. However, this argument applies to food infl ation, but not to headline infl a-
tion, which is what the central banks are mandated to control. Lastly, it can be argued that al-
lowing currencies to appreciate attracts more short-term capital fl ows, generating expectations 
of futher appreciations in the future, which would reinforce appreciation pressures even more.
The cuts in offi cial interest rates by the US Federal Reserve System have widened the offi cial 
interest rate differential between the Fed and many emerging economies’ central banks, mak-
ing it more diffi cult for the latter to resist appreciation and infl ation pressures. Consequently, in 
order to effect the necessary monetary tightening in a way compatible with the need to contain 
appreciation, some central banks have resorted to raising reserve requirements or imposing 
temporary capital controls. These measures may be useful in the short term, but may impact 
on monetary policy transmission in other ways and are usually less effective in the medium 
term.
The increase in infl ation may erode the credibility of the monetary authorites, given the opening 
of a wide gap between the infl ation target (or offi cially forecast infl ation) and actual infl ation. In 
the left-hand panel of Chart 7, the upper column illustrates this divergence for a sample of 
emerging countries that use direct infl ation targeting, while the lower columns show the ex-
pected deviation at the end of 2008 and of 2009. While the gap noticeably narrows in the 
medium term, it remains positive in almost all of the countries, including over the longest hori-
zon (the third column).
-1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Brazil
Chile
Mexico
Israel
Turkey (c)
South Africa
Poland
Hungary
Czech Rep.
Korea
Philippines
 CURRENT INFLATION (MINUS TARGET)
 EXPECTED INFLATION 2008 (MINUS TARGET)(b)
 EXPECTED INFLATION 2009 (MINUS TARGET)(b)
EXPECTED INFLATION AND INFLATION TARGET (a)
INFLATION TARGETS AND ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES CHART 7
SOURCES: Consensus Forecast, national statistics, FAO and Banco de España.
a. For cases in which the inflation target is set in accordance with a range of values, the average point in 
the range was used.
b. For Latin America, forecasts are for December; for the remaining countries, mid-year forecasts.
c. The inflation target for 2009 was recently revised upward from 4% to 7.5%.
d. Based on a sample of 77 countries.
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Tariff
reductions
Export
restrictions
Use of
reserves
Price
controls/
consumption
subsidies
None
ADMINISTRATIVE MEASURES TO COUNTER THE 
INCREASE IN FOOD PRICES (d)
% of countries
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 15 ECONOMIC BULLETIN, JULY 2008 COMMODITIES, INFLATION AND MONETARY POLICY: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
This development poses a challenge to the central banks in these countries, as their credibil-
ity is associated in the medium term with the achievement of the announced infl ation targets. 
Partly as a result, various proposals have surfaced in recent months to modify infl ation target-
ing in some countries, e.g. by adopting a core rather than a headline infl ation target since it is 
less exposed to short-term fl uctuations, by lengthening the periods of time over which the in-
fl ation target must be reached, or, like Turkey, by revising the infl ation target upwards. In all 
cases, there remains a lot of room for manoeuvre to shape the monetary policy response to 
infl ation developments, which may be temporary or due to specifi c goods. An additional argu-
ment in favour of adopting a core infl ation target is that it is core infl ation that is most directly 
affected by monetary policy. However, there may be external pressures on the central bank 
behind this debate, which raises the questions on the independence of the monetary author-
ity.
As stressed at the beginning of this section, the current rise in infl ation is a critical challenge for 
emerging countries in terms of building on the advances made in recent years. To this end, the 
monetary authorities are advised to observe the frameworks established to achieve their infl a-
tion targets and to resist the temptation (or pressures) to move the goalposts, since this could 
bring about a loss of credibility for monetary policy and the central bank as an institution. In this 
context, the central bank communication policies are particularly important in effectively con-
veying the reasons for potentially missing an infl ation target and in justifying the monetary 
policy decisions taken. This recommendation applies equally to advanced and emerging 
economies, irrespective of the type of monetary policy regime.
Other types of policy can help the economy to adjust to the rise in commodity prices, also 
contributing to limiting the infl ationary impact of this shock.
Fiscal policy plays a prominent role in that it can support monetary policy in easing infl ationary 
pressures. In countries where the terms of trade are improving and are having a positive im-
pact on tax revenues, it may be inferred from the foregoing that fi scal policy should adopt a 
counter-cyclical stance. The greater the degree of improvement in the terms of trade and the 
more transitory this is perceived to be, the more marked this stance should be. In this regard, 
the most complex issue when implementing fi scal policy is how to manage the increase in tax 
takings stemming from the improvement in the terms of trade and, in particular, to decide on 
how much to adjust the level of spending upward. On one hand, there is usually some uncer-
tainty over the duration of the improvement; on the other, there may be limits to the economy’s 
capacity to absorb the external boom and to the increase in disposable income. Lastly, it is 
useful to establish mechanisms for absorbing and accumulating these funds for future cyclical 
contingencies. In fact, some commodity exporting countries have set up stabilisation funds or 
sovereign wealth funds precisely for the purpose of dampening the direct impact of the eco-
nomic boom, spreading out the revenue over the cycle and/or accumulating and investing 
funds for future generations. Although these funds have grown exponentially in recent years, 
in many countries there is plenty of room for improving the effi cient use of such funds.
It is also important when devising economic policies in emerging countries to take into account 
the social impact of price increases in staple goods, which are particularly affected by the rise 
in commodity prices (as in the case for food shown in the central right-hand panel of Chart 3). 
Concerns in this regard have led many governments to adopt an array of administrative meas-
ures to restrict the rises in food and energy prices for the poorest segments of the population. 
The right-hand panel of Chart 7 shows the results of a survey carried out by the FAO, which 
assesses some of these measures and their sizeable infl uence in a wide sample of countries, 
affecting in some cases more than half of the countries. 
The response of other 
economic policies
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Some of these measures, such as lowering import tariffs (or duties), are aimed at reducing the 
fi nal cost of the goods and have been used extensively in the past few months. Ultimately, 
these policies help iron out market distortions and can thus be considered positive. Measures 
designed specifi cally to boost the supply of commodities and the productivity of the agricul-
tural sector (e.g. subsidies for fertilisers and investment in machinery) may also be considered 
in a favourable light. Likewise, conditional cash transfers, aimed at mitigating the shrinking 
purchasing power of the most vulnerable (with high relative food consumption) are, in principle, 
also well received. Indeed, one of the main objections to subsidies to production or these 
kinds of transfer relates to the way in which they are implemented, since they can lead to dis-
tortions and perverse incentives. In this respect, it is worth highlighting the experience of Latin 
America in recent years, which through its social programmes based on these kinds of trans-
fer9 has shown itself to have an appropriate infrastructure for transferring assistance of this 
type swiftly and effi ciently. 
In contrast, several countries have been implementing measures that are having a distortion-
ary effect on the market. Among these are the restrictions or bans on exports of specifi c 
goods, price controls or freezes, and generalised food and energy consumption subsidies. 
Moreover, the latter are usually counter-productive in that the better-off tend to consume more 
of these goods. Export restrictions or bans have been adopted by almost 30% of the coun-
tries, while price controls have been adopted by over half of them, making them the most 
widely adopted measure. All of these measures hinder the adjustment of production and con-
sumption to the change in relative prices, and they mostly lead to the price rises persisting. 
Tihis is either because they prevent a correction of demand (as would occur, for example, if the 
commodity price increases were passed on to the fi nal consumer) or because they tend to 
exacerbate supply constraints at the global level (by restricting exports). The use of reserves 
(by 20% of the countries) also distorts price signals, but may be justifi ed in the event of the 
food shortages recently experienced in many countries.
These administrative measures also have repercussions on fi scal and monetary policies. The 
budgetary impact of some of these measures means that fi scal policy may ultimately take on an 
expansionary bias in an infl ationary environment, which should be countered with fi scal meas-
ures in the opposite direction. The fi scal cost of the measures can be high – in some cases of 
the order of several percentage points of GDP – and may grow over time. Furthermore, some 
of the measures contribute to the deterioration in the current account balance. In some coun-
tries, mainly in Asia, governments are cutting these subsidies, many of which have been imple-
mented for decades, because the fi scal costs have reached unsustainable levels. For this rea-
son, the measures must be well designed and temporary. The problem is that, for reasons of 
political economy, some of these measures are easier to introduce than to dismantle.
With regard to monetary policy, these measures have a direct impact on infl ation. This can work 
in one direction or another, depending on the type of measure: price controls tend to reduce 
infl ation in the component in question, while passing on the price increases to the consumer 
tends to induce a rise in infl ation. However, over and above these effects, possibly the most 
signifi cant implications relate to the role of the monetary authority itself. Since some of these 
administrative measures are aimed at mitigating price increases, they are, in a way, anti-infl a-
tionary – even if restricted to very specifi c components. This could lead to them gaining in 
prominence or becoming perceived as alternatives to conventional monetary policy. Most of 
9. These development initiatives, known as cash transfer programs, transfer money to low-income households on condi-
tion that the parents send their children to primary school, attend regular medical check-ups and turn up for talks given 
at local health centres.
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them are designed in response to exceptional circumstances and should be abandoned once 
these have been overcome. However, as pointed out above, sometimes as a result of the in-
centives, the very opposite occurs and the measures are retained. For this reason, there is al-
ways a risk that this kind of measure might take root, which could led to confl ict between the 
different economic policy authorities and undermine the credibility of the central banks.
The rise in commodity prices, in particular energy and food prices, has triggered a worldwide 
increase in headline infl ation since late 2006. In emerging countries, this rise has been steeper, 
in absolute and relative terms, than in developed countries. One possible reason for the 
stronger impact on the overall price index lies in the fact that lower levels of development gen-
erally entail a heavier weight of food in the CPI and a greater pass-through of international to 
national food prices. Although it would be diffi cult for commodity prices to continue growing at 
the rates seen in recent months, there is cause to expect that prices will remain high in the 
medium term.
Among the emerging countries, infl ationary pressures have tended to be stronger in commod-
ity exporting countries and those with rigid exchange rates, in particular when they are pegged 
to the US dollar. In some countries both of these factors have coincided, painting a particu-
larly worrisome picture since, as has been discussed in this article, in order for the economy 
to adjust to improved terms of trade, an appreciation of the real exchange rate is required. If 
this is not effected through a revaluation of the nominal exchange rate, it will ultimately manifest 
itself as higher infl ation.
The increase in headline infl ation has so far scarcely fed through to core infl ation rates or me-
dium-term infl ation expectations. Nevertheless, these kinds of effect are starting to be ob-
served in a number of emerging economies. This stability, combined with the uncertainty sur-
rounding the economic outlook and the expectation that price increases will ultimately ease 
off, explains the generally cautious response by the monetary authorities. In short, the rise in 
commodity prices is an adjustment of relative prices, which central banks should continue to 
monitor carefully to ensure that it does not generate second-round effects or have an impact 
on medium-term infl ation expectations. It should, however, be noted that real interest rates 
have fallen in almost all of the countries in question during this phase of mounting infl ation, 
which would denote an easing of monetary policy stances.
Nevertheless, the growing and persistent gap between headline and core infl ation gives cause 
for concern, and monetary policy is faced with several challenges on a global scale. And the 
challenges facing developing countries are even greater. This is not only due to the fact that 
the increase in infl ation has been higher in these countries and that, in some of them, core 
infl ation is already on the rise, but is also because price stability is a recent achievement and 
anti-infl ation credibility is less anchored than in the advanced economies. This situation thus 
presents a clear risk to the consolidation of the low infl ation regimes that were so hard to 
achieve. In countries with a less favourable institutional context, administrative measures to 
contain food and energy infl ation – some of which are justifi ed in the light of the exceptional 
market situation – have proliferated, constituting an additional obstacle for central bankers. 
More specifi cally, such measures risk mutating into factors that undermine the conduct of 
monetary policy and the very autonomy of the central bank, as a result of their distortionary 
effect on prices and because they come to be seen as an alternative way of combating infl a-
tion, which is neither conventional nor desirable.
Faced with these challenges and the complexity of conducting monetary policy, it is essential 
for all monetary authorities to respond in a prudent and fi rm manner. This applies especially to 
Conclusions 
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emerging economies, which must avoid making changes to the operational framework of 
monetary policy and reaffi rm their autonomy and commitment to price stability.
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